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Electoral systems are the subject of research of many scientific disciplines. 
Mathematical sciences are also successful in dealing with them. The need to 
develop methods of seat allocation requires the involvement of experts in 
this field.1 Very often, they have had to address very specific challenges and 
fulfil political orders to develop a system that would meet pre-defined politi-
cal needs. The projects of Thomas Hare, Carl Andrae, Victor d’Hondt, André 
Sainte-Laguë, Horst Fridrich Niemeyer and others were nothing more but 
a response to the criticism of the majority system, its injustice and deform-
ability, as well as a desire to “rectify” proportional systems. After all, the era 
of proportional systems could not have started had it not been for mathemati-
cians, who proposed their methods of seat allocation. This, in fact, coincided 
in time with their actual introduction into political practice. In the middle 
of the 19th century, as soon as proposals for proportional methods were 
declared, they were immediately introduced.2 
Specialists in social sciences also rely, with lesser and greater success, on 
the results of these mathematical calculations. There are also different judge-
ments as to the qualification of certain solutions to either the proportional 
system or the majority system, as is the case with the transferrable vote. On the 
other hand, formal language is often present in publications addressing election 
issues. For obvious reasons, such research is also conducted by experts in legal 
sciences. After all, election laws belong to a very important group of national 
constitutional laws, and it is these laws that are used for regulating electoral 
system in the states that are familiar with the concept of organic laws. Election 
issues are also contemplated in sociology, including the sociology of politics.
In the circle of political science, the issue of electoral systems may be con-
sidered, among others, from the point of view of political and legal doctrines 
(the ideas of representative democracy), history and the contemporariness of 
state regimes, mechanisms of converting votes into seats and their impact 
on party systems, as well as research on electoral deformations understood 
mostly as a lack of proportion between the number of votes and the number 
of seats achieved. One must also not forget about the important issue of 
political behaviour or electoral marketing. The study of electoral systems is 
broken down into a few planes: 1) elections to state government institutions; 
2) elections to local government institutions (components of a federation, 
institutions of autonomous communities, local authorities), whose regimes in 
modern democracies differ substantially3; 3) elections to supranational insti-
tutions (currently — to the European Parliament). 
1 Extensive research in this field is carried out at the Wrocław University of Economy.
2 In 1855, though the first concepts had appeared earlier. 
3 See also M. doMAgAłA, j. iWAnek: “Regionalne i lokalne ustroje polityczno-prawne.” 
In: „Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis.” Vol. 11. Eds. J. iWAnek, M. stolARczyk, co-op. 
R. glAJcAr. Katowice 2013, pp. 15—29.
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Such a broad-based analysis, which takes into account a multitude of 
variables, can certainly reveal a complete picture of the electoral systems of 
a state,4 whereas from a comparative (inter-state) perspective, it allows one to 
visualise trends and describe the dominant solutions within a specific group 
of democratic states. Furthermore, such an analysis may be of a short- or 
long-term nature. In turn, a smaller scale project can successfully limit the 
electoral system only to those bodies thatconstitute the core of the political 
system of the state. In other words, it will encompass the institutions that, by 
virtue of their position and competence, play a vital role in the country and 
determine the essence of its political system. It is, after all, in these institu-
tions that the decision-making process of the highest order is concentrated. 
Sometimes it may only apply to the lower chamber of parliament, and less 
often, to the both of them, if the position of the chambers are balanced (so-
called bicamerlism). In presidential or presidential-parliamentary systems, 
mechanisms for electing heads of state are also of the essence. In each of 
these variants, it is also possible to analyse the dependencies between elec-
toral systems and party systems, in their complex vertical form (nationwide, 
regional and local levels). Such a picture, though incomplete, is, on account 
of its validity, sufficient enough. 
First of all I would like to draw attention to the issues concerning the rela-
tionship between the expression of public volition and the filling of electable 
public institutions of a democratic state. In particular, I would like to seek 
an answer to the following questions: To what extent does public volition 
remain directly correlated with the personal composition of an institution of 
the state? Is the will of the majority of the active electorate an expression of 
the volition of the majority of society? Is the concept of majority considered 
an expression of a doctrinal volition of the general public (volonté générale), 
or is it only an instrument for the election and appointment of public authori-
ties? These are not only doctrinal questions, as they need to be answered 
via empirical investigations and analysis of significant amounts of material 
from a number of selected, representative democratic European countries. 
The answers must therefore remain in the circle of the study of the factors 
that determine the division into constituencies, the methods for allocating 
seats within the borders of the constituencies, the methods of the distribu-
tion of seats between the electoral lists and the candidates, as well as the 
voting methods. In other words, it comes down to the organisational and 
institutional solutions of electoral systems, and also, to a certain extent, to 
the legal solutions. It is important, however, not to subject the latter aspect to 
a normative analysis, which is so typical of legal sciences. Regard also needs 
to be paid to questions about the relationships between the electoral and party 
4 There may be several electoral systems in one state. 
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systems, and more broadly, between political systems. These are questions of 
fundamental, cardinal importance for the assessment of democratic systems. 
After all, a systemic approach requires that a study be made of the relation-
ships between the accepted, doctrinally, but often also politically motivated, 
elements of electoral systems. Electoral systems form a specific organiza-
tional framework in which people make important political decisions. Issues 
related to the motivations of voters, that is concerning electoral behaviour 
and electoral marketing, shall remain beyond the boundaries of interest.
It would seem that the achievement of a direct and relatively simple rela-
tionship between the will of the public and the political and personal compo-
sition of the institutions of the state is something easy, that the essential and 
constitutive feature of modern democracy, namely free and fair elections, is 
fulfilled, as long as electoral votes have not been forged and have been hon-
estly converted into seats.5 
In addition, it is difficult to agree with the opinion that a political party 
that has won the elections, which is understood as having won more votes 
and seats than the competition, is the one that received the support of the 
majority of society.
This simple, and unfortunately, false correlation, has become part of the 
language of the politics of today. It has almost become a fetish stopping us 
from undertaking any reflection on its meaning and truthfulness. However, 
at this point it is worth asking, unreasonably as it may appear, the question 
whether it is at all possible to achieve an electoral result that would also con-
stitute an expression of will of the majority of the population? If the answer 
to this question is affirmative, then it is so under one condition: it is achieved 
incredibly rarely. As a rule, in fact, the majority is nothing more than an 
expression of some form of a social minority. This belief is confirmed by 
a few simple comparisons: 1) the voter turnout (number of voters, and in fact 
the validity of the votes cast) compared to the total number of eligible voters 
(the electorate), 2) the outcome of the election (number of votes) of the vic-
torious party, that is the one that won more votes than the competition on 
a nationwide scale, and 3) the conversion of votes into seats, using a method 
5 There are so-called “clean” proportionality solutions, in which a simple conversion of 
votes into seats is practiced (one of its versions is the so-called “automatic allocation”). Votes 
are converted into seats on a nation-wide basis, and the motivation for the division of a state 
into electoral administrative districts is purely organisational. In such districts, seat alloca-
tion does not take place. Such a system was used in the Weimar Republic. However, even 
these solutions yield potential deformation. D. nohlen notes this phenomenon by indicating, 
among others, deformations resulting from the failure to ensure a minimum electoral repre-
sentation (Compare Sistemas electorales del Mundo. Madrid 1981, pp. 366—367). An adjust-
ment of the voting process in the constituencies involving a parallel or secondary allocation 
of the seats across the state was used on numerous occasions (Belgium, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Israel and others).
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that usually produces different results with the same number of output data. 
Thus, if we consider an optimistic scenario with a voter turnout of approx. 
70%, with the winning party having won more than 50% of the votes, which 
generally is not required as very often it is only necessary to obtain over 
40% of the votes to receive more than 50% of the seats, then even with such 
optimistic assumptions, the winning party can govern alone with an absolute 
majority in parliament enjoying the support of about 30—40% of the elector-
ate, or in other words the support of only about 1/3 of eligible voters. In other 
words, only with a turnout of about 90% and the support of more than 50% 
of the electoral votes, it can be stated that the voting majority constitutes the 
support of the majority of society. These results, however, occur rarely and 
are not necessary to ensure one party an absolute number of seats in parlia-
ment, and therefore a stable, one-party governance throughout the entire term 
of office. This, however, is not normally the case, and therefore, the assertion 
so often proclaimed by politicians that the winner enjoys the support of the 
majority of society is nothing but the acceptance of a false assumption that 
society constitutes the electorate, that is the part of it that has the right to 
exercise its cardinal political rights, and that received the support of more 
than half of the electorate. Therefore, one must assume that the majority today 
is nothing short of a contractual instrument for the election of public authori-
ties in a democratic manner. So little and so much at the same time. The belief 
that the majority principle is based on a procedure dates back to early liberal-
ism. “It does not guarantee a choice and therefore it does not guarantee the 
best, competent, effective and fair power” — claims Adam Jamróz.6 It is only 
a directive, as the majority of the voting majority is rarely synonymous with 
the majority of the population. All the more so, as today, there is dominanta 
notion of a simple, normal, relative majority which is based on the advantage 
over one of the competitors, not on the majority in relation to all the others. 
The majority in question, though still used in places both in elections to col-
lective and single-person bodies of government, is very often replaced in the 
subsequent round of elections by a simple majority. The conviction of the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment thinkers that only the volonté générale is 
an expression of an absolute majority had long ago faded into oblivion.7 
Out of the many ways to identify and define democracy, we can still point 
out two basic approaches, that is two ways, within which we can find opposite 
positions.8 The first include views that refer to the goals and values that should 
6 A. jAMRóz: Demokracja. Białystok 1999, p. 21.
7 Not to mention the Polish concept of the liberum veto meaning that the majority means 
everybody.
8 A synthetic presentation of the theory of democracy can be found in A. AntoszeWski: 
“Współczesne teorie demokracji.” In: Studia z teorii polityki. Vol. 2. Eds. A.W. jABłoński, 
l. SoBKowiAK. Wrocław 1998.
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be achieved through democracy (teleological and axiological approach), and 
the second, which has remained popular since the announcement of Joseph 
A. Schumpeter’s proposal, is to draw more attention to a formal, procedural 
approach, where the question of “how we govern?” seems to be more impor-
tant. The words of Hans Kelsen stating that the use of the term democracy 
depends on the occasion and on the prevailing political trends, which it is 
the most abused political term assuming all sorts of contradictory meanings, 
still remains true. Giovani Sartori adds that until the 40s of the 20th cen-
tury we had known what democracy was. Since then, however, we have all 
come to like it, but gradually ceased to understand what it is. At the same 
time he writes very categorically: “Democracies exist because we invent-
ed them, because they are in our minds; They exist only insofar as we can 
maintain them. [Demokracje istnieją, ponieważ je wynaleźliśmy, ponieważ 
są w naszych umysłach; istnieją tylko w takim stopniu, w jakim potrafimy je 
utrzymać].”9 He also refers to democracy as a by-product of “a competitive 
method for recruiting leadership.”10 
Democracy, in principle, does not have one theoretical model. One should 
rather bring it down to a very specific form. Very often we talk about the idea 
of democracy, but it is variable and, what is most important, it is a product 
of a specific debate situated in time and space. If we know and refer to its 
specific forms (without assessing whether they are or were justified), such as 
Ancient, Athenian, Bourgeois, Nobles, Liberal, Modern Democracy to name 
a few, we also express the view that there is no democracy in general, but 
only one of its types. Theoretical views on democracy, however, are more 
the result of the description and analysis of empirical, practical democracy 
than previous theoretical constructs. Democracy has disappeared as a cos-
mopolitan concept (timeless and spaceless). However, even though national 
democracies are predominant, neither did they develop nor did they operate 
in isolation and in vacuum. They interact with each other, creating politi-
cal system solutions and standards of political practice. The influence of the 
external environment in the process of cultural diffusion is indisputable, and 
is of great importance for national democracies. It leads to the formation of 
a common plane of similar attributes of democracy. Provided they are accept-
ed and preserved, they will successfully become the standards of modern 
democracy as products of culture. In order to describe the external environ-
ment of national democracies, I use the concept of transnational democracy, 
by which I mean a strictly defined group of standard solutions governing the 
law and constitution, political processes and behaviour of the political institu-
 9 G. SArTori: Teoria demokracji. Transl. P. AmSTerdAmSKi, d. grinBerg. Warszawa 
1994, p. 194.
10 Ibidem, p. 34.
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tions (including state institutions), the judicial system and social processes, 
as well as entities that developed and consolidated in the given cultural envi-
ronment and time. This also applies to accepted, or at least tolerated political 
ideas of the democratic countries of a given cultural circle. The point is for 
certain concepts and categories to be understood, if not identically, then at 
least similarly or without contradiction towards one another. These standards 
have been established via long-term practice.11 
Empirical, applied democracy differs from the postulated and desired 
democracy type. These differences are also visibly clear when we compare 
it to rationalised democracy, which utilises the experience and shaped stand-
ards of governance of other countries (mainly based on the rule of law), the 
political will of government exercised without restraint, in which democracy 
is seen not as an end in itself but as an instrument for achieving prospective 
or short-term political goals. The first and second understanding of democ-
racy have repeatedly been the object of political bickering. Frequently, too, 
media and political speakers restrict themselves to using the etymological 
meaning of demos and krateo. The debate is sometimes brought down to 
a primitive, yet catchy interpretation: the rule of the majority (which is usu-
ally only a certain form of minority) cannot be subject to restrictions as, 
since it is a majority, it has the freedom to act as it pleases. Democracy with-
out restrictions, without constraint, which serves to execute political voli-
tion (even of an anti-democratic nature) can quite easily become its contra-
diction. A theoretical and partly ideological understanding of democracy is 
often detached from political practice. This belief is not a discovery of our 
time. The dispute about whether a particular form of government is (was) 
a democracy, a political system conforming to the idea of democracy, has 
appeared quite often. Democracy, in its contemporary framework, bounda-
ries and content is not, after all, a timeless absolute, but only a variation typi-
cal of our time. As every kind of value, democracy too is subject to gradual 
change in time and in space. It also changes in specific historical conditions. 
Democracy has become a myth. Stanisław Filipowicz characterises it thus: 
“Today, Lincoln’s credo — the sentence found in his Gettysburg Address 
that democracy is »the government of the people, by the people and for the 
people« became the basis for a public profession of faith. In the trivialized 
version, ridden of a deeper meaning, but bearing enormous force as provided 
via the support of the media, it has created a closed horizon of eternal truths 
about politics. It turned into a myth. After all, it was conceived that liberal 
democracy is a definitive shape the world has assumed, that we have reached 
11 See also J. iwAneK: „Standaryzacja demokracji współczesnej.” In: Studia nad współ-
czesnymi systemami politycznymi: Księga dedykowana profesorowi Andrzejowi Antoszew-
skiemu. T. 1: Podmioty i procesy demokratyczne. Eds. J. juchnoWski, R. WisznioWski. Wroc-
ław 2014, pp. 174—176.
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an end.”12 Subsequently, however, the above observation inspired posing of 
the following cardinal question: “Freedom, participation, sovereignty, repre-
sentation, emancipation, human rights, justice, the rule of the people ... These 
words can, of course, appear in various configurations, in all shapes and sizes 
[…] They form a horizon beyond which political discourse, in fact, tries not 
to transcend. But what do they really mean? Precisely.”13 The axiological 
dimension of democracy understood as the pursuit of the common good is 
nothing but a continuous debate. As defined by David Held: “Demokracja jest 
jedynie »metanarracją«, która prawomocnie wyznacza przestrzeń mieszczącą 
konkurencyjne narracja naszych czasów”. Gdyż nie akceptuje się tylko 
jednej jej wartości, „… ale jako wartość traktuje łączenie i godzenie ze sobą 
konkurencyjnych recept” [“Democracy is only a »metanarrative« that legiti-
mately defines the space for competing narratives of our time”. For not only 
one of its values is accepted, “... but combining and reconciling competing 
solutions is treated as a value in itself”].14 This debate also means the inabil-
ity to impose on others one’s own axiological construct and its interpretation. 
It will not go unnoticed that not so long ago, namely at the beginning of the 
90s of the 20th century, it was popular to believe that the consecutive waves 
of democratisation would lead to the elimination of democracy’s competition 
(socialism), and as such it had a very strong chance of becoming a world 
system, a dominant form of government. Unfortunately, it was often ignored 
that democracy has its cultural roots and is dependent on a whole range of 
conditions, including, of course, ones that originate in civilization. Admira-
tion, but also disappointment of this form of government, which appeared 
so powerfully in intellectual discourse as early as in the nineteenth century, 
has been made dormant today in part by the “impoverishment of the process 
of understanding” as Giovani Sartori tended to refer to it. “Television pro-
duces images and destroys ideas; by doing so it weakens our ability to think 
abstractly and with it all, our ability to understand.”15 Therefore, in fact, it 
makes it impossible to understand such abstract concepts as the nation, the 
state, the sovereign people, bureaucracy, etc., which, as invisible and theoreti-
cal concepts, make it possible to exercise control over nature and “the ability 
to create a political and economic environment.”16 Paradoxically, the public 
media, which are the product of democracy, and which make the existence 
and functioning of democracy possible, are, on the one hand a blessing, but 
12 S. FiliPoWicz: Demokracja. O władzy iluzji w królestwie rozumu. Warszawa 2007, 
p. 14.
13 Ibidem, pp. 14—15.
14 D. held: Modele demokracji. Transl. W. nowicKi. Kraków 2010, p. 336.
15 G. SArTori: Homo videns. Telewizja i postmyślenie. Transl. J. uszyński. Warszawa 
2007, p. 27.
16 Ibidem, p. 26.
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also a threat to a free, undominated democratic debate. It can also be claimed 
that mass manipulability is also a feature of modern democracy. While other 
authorities have a status which is to a greater of lesser degree regulated by 
law and political practice, media authorities are not subject to such regula-
tions at all or only partly, and the competitiveness between them is greatly 
reduced.17 
The belief that modern democracy is a representative, indirect democ-
racy, with state institutions elected by the people despite initial resistance of 
part of the doctrine, has come to be under the clear influence of the political 
selection of the political system and years of practice. The principle of repre-
sentation from the very beginning has been linked to the principle of national 
sovereignty. Collectivity, no matter how it was determined historically (via 
the people, nation, society), became a source of power, its object, and also, in 
practice, its subject. The problem how this representativeness shall be deli- 
vered, was from the beginning and still continues to be one of the founda-
tions of this system. Was there a baseline model for the rule of representa-
tion, or rather, was there ever a model election system which would accom-
plish this representation? The answer to this question is negative. Initially, 
a majority system was used, as no other system was known. Nevertheless, it 
is worth posing the question in order to inquire about the sense and legitima-
cy of electoral deformities. The concept of deformation suggests unambigu-
ously that there is such a state that differs from the desired state, a previously 
assumed state, a baseline model or a formed assumption. A fuller answer to 
this question, should we not wish to bring the issues of deformation down 
to the problem of the relationship between the index that is the percentage 
of votes obtained vs. the percentage number of seats in the collective repre-
sentative bodies, is a matter of political doctrine, and also an issue, the result 
of an analysis on empirical democracy, which creates the so-called system 
standards of this form of government.18 
Modern democracies have not only been reduced to representative democ-
racies, which were so strongly contested in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, but in addition, the concept of the majority was reduced to what is 
called a simple majority. Thanks to such an approach, parties that frequently 
enjoyed electoral support of no more than between 10—20% (in relation to 
the electorate) are considered, falsely enough, as those that have the support 
of the majority of society. The phenomenon of over-representation and under-
representation is, unfortunately, quite common. The problem comes down 
more to the scale of this phenomenon. Extreme manifestations of deforma-
17 See also J. iwAneK: „Czwarta władza w systemie demokratycznym.” In: Władza, 
media, polityka. Ed. M. gierulA, co-op. M. WieloPolskA-szyMuRA. Katowice 2006.
18 See also J. iwAneK: “Standaryzacja.” In: Władza, media…
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tion include a situation in which the winner who wins more votes than his 
competitors, in reality loses the election, yielding fewer seats. This issue con-
cerns to a lesser extent the election of single-person authorities, as long as the 
election is direct.19 However, the legitimisation to govern (legitima potestas) 
is in no way excluded. Nevertheless, it is worth differentiating between the 
legitimacy ranges and not confusing purely political legitimacy, which is the 
result of an election, with the so-called wide legitimacy, which refers to vari-
ous, if not all spheres of social life. Such a broad validation of political power 
(in the sociological sense of total power) can even be harmful for democracy. 
Legitimacy, which is a function of the election result, is quite sufficient for 
this form of government. After all, legal legitimacy is maintained if all the 
regulatory requirements of electoral law are complied with. Tadeusz Biernat 
aptly concludes: “The treatment of legitimacy in a broader context means 
a consideration of the legitimisation process in relation to political activities, 
the underlying motives, broadly defined cultural conditions, and not only to 
the rules of creation and the exercise of power.”20 David Held, in assessing 
the genesis of modern democracy, notes the following: „Dążąc do demokracji 
widziano w niej mechanizm legitymizujący takie decyzje polityczne, które 
odpowiadają przyjętym zasadom, regułom i praktykom uczestnictwa, przed-
stawicielstwa i odpowiedzialności.”21 
The majority we are interested in, that is its axiomatic form, is very popu-
lar. It produces a sense of power and community for the ruled, and gives 
a sense of mission for those in power. However, void of its ideological con-
text, it refers to a mechanism for electing political power, that is an electoral 
mechanism. “[…] democracy, Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński notes, is thus rather 
a collection of procedures than an ideology… a form, a collection of formal 
rules and institutions, in the framework of which there is room for various 
ideologies, and each of them is formally equal.”22 On the other hand, failing 
to give consideration to its teleological and axiological constituents is unde-
sired, even if there is no agreement as to the meanings. Adam Jamróz, who 
leans towards a “procedural” understanding of democracy, points out that 
“Democracy presents itself to us as a collection of values and rules relating 
to the functioning of society and the state.”23 
19 In this context, the results of the US presidential and vice-presidential elections of 
2000 can be considered as an extreme example of deformation, although votes were of course 
converted according to the law. The person that won the election in terms of the number of 
votes, actually lost.
20 T. BiernAT: Legitymizacja władzy politycznej. Elementy teorii. Toruń 2000, p. 32.
21 D. held: Modele…, p. 335.
22 E. Wnuk-liPiński: Demokratyczna rekonstrukcja. Z socjologii radykalnej zmiany spo-
łecznej. Warszawa 1996, p. 39.
23 A. JAMRóz: Demokracja…, p. 5.
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Representative democracy is often in contradiction with desired and pos-
tulated democracy, also termed as “just” and “true” democracy. However, 
we are interested in answering the question: to what extent does the direct 
expression of the undistorted volition of the sovereign, which determines 
the political and personal composition of the state authorities, is related to 
the description of the conditions, which are directly responsible for ensuring 
and not ensuring such a composition? It is political elites, which are vested 
with the task of shaping electoral systems, in particular its legal aspects, that 
define these conditions. To a certain extent they are the result of the dominat-
ing convictions about the doctrine, about the electoral standards of democ-
racy, but very often also about the given social and political situation. An 
electoral system may determine the entities that will win or lose the elections 
and as such may impact, to a certain degree, the electoral result even before 
the elections take place. The discussion is thus about the various conditions 
in which representative democracy functions as a concrete, contemporary 
version of democracy, conditions determining the actual election of social 
representation. They are at the same time fields of research which are of key 
importance to the methodology of electoral systems research. 
1.1.
The rules of electoral law are without a shadow of a doubt the most impor-
tant aspect of the research. One needs to keep in mind, however, that it is nei-
ther possible, nor desired to characterise all of them in their entirety at this 
point of time. It is nevertheless worth identifying those aspects of electoral 
law thatmay hinder the full expression of the will of the public, and distort it 
at the same time. I perceive the key electoral rule of universality in a negative 
light,24 as a ban on introducing group exclusion in the exercise of the active 
24 A negative approach has the advantage of always constituting a short and complete 
description. Most often, however, if universality is defined — which is in no way a standard 
in works on electoral issues — it is defined as something positive. For example, D. nohlen 
writes: „Norma prawna powszechności wyborów oznacza, że w zasadzie wszyscy obywatele 
są wyborcami i wybieralnymi, niezależnie od płci, rasy, języka, majątku, wyznania, pocho-
dzenia społecznego, wykształcenia, albo poglądów politycznych” (Sistemas electorales…, 
p. 65); L. gArlicKi writes that: “This rule defines a group of subjects who possess electoral 
rights, and requires that all legal age citizens of the state be entitled to at least an active right 
to vote” (Polskie prawo konstytucyjne. Zarys wykładu. Warszawa 1999, p. 124); W. kRęcisz 
also defines this rule in very similar terms (Polskie prawo konstytucyjne. Ed. W. skRzydło. 
Lublin 2004, p. 200; B. BAnAszAk is one of the few people who define this rule negatively: 
“The rule of universality imposes a ban on excluding citizens of social groups incorporated 
in what constitutes the collective sovereign from the active right to vote” (Porównawcze 
prawo konstytucyjne współczesnych państw demokratycznych. Kraków 2004, p. 345.) This 
definition is closest to my viewpoint, except for the fragment dealing with the subjects that 
can be excluded. 
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right to vote.25 Since the turn of the sixties of the previous century, this rule 
has been fully utilised in democratic countries, which led to the removal of 
the last obstacle, namely that of age,26 however, there are new challenges we 
have to face these days. These are challenges which might outline the new 
boundaries of universality. Currently, a new minimum age of 16 years is 
being tested. However, the experience of some countries (e.g. Austria and 
partly also Germany and Slovenia)27 will determine the further evolution of 
homo politicus and a new age defining the political maturity of modern man. 
Previously, these types of solutions were used rather in non-democratic sys-
tems (e.g. in Nicaragua in the 80s of the 20th century)28 than in democratic 
ones. The same situation concerned the minimum age of 18 years, which was 
so quickly adopted by non-democratic states, very often beating the 20th 
century democracies in its implementation. The creation of these regulations 
in systems with non-competitive elections most probably resulted from the 
conviction that they will be more conducive to the manipulation of young 
people. Utilizing children and youth by terrorist groups and totalitarian states 
is a phenomenon which is well known and described. Young people, also 
those in democratic states, who do not have the necessary life experience, 
are more vulnerable to techniques aimed at manipulating their consciousness. 
A precise analysis of this issue, however, remains the responsibility of 
researchers in social psychology.
It appears that the age limit for active suffrage should remain directly cor-
related with the moment of gaining full legal rights, as the right to vote is often 
derived from the civil law. Nevertheless, allowing citizens between the ages of 
16 and 18 to vote may change political results of elections of many traditional 
political parties as well as impact election marketing methods. A differenti-
ated age structure of society will diversify the scale of this phenomenon. 
1.2.
Citizenship is another issue related to active suffrage. European integra-
tion has introduced significant changes in this field. This concerns not only 
25 This means that individual exclusions based on court rulings are acceptable, while in 
the case of the passive right to vote it is possible to go as far as introducing group exclusions 
as well.
26 The minimum age of 18 years was removed much earlier in political systems which 
employed uncompetitive elections, but it is for this very reason that this circumstance cannot 
be taken into consideration.
27 Compare: M. WAszAk, j. zBieRAnek: Propozycja obniżenia granicy wieku czynnego 
prawa wyborczego do 16 lat. Warszawa 2010. 
28 The aforementioned authors are unjustifiably surprised that this minimum age has 
already been lowered in undemocratic countries: “Paradoxically, undemocratic regimes often 
lower the minimum age.” Ibidem, p. 4.
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electoral laws at a local government level, but also elections to the European 
Parliament. The criterion of citizenship is being replaced by the residence 
address criterion, hence raising the significance of the old rule of domicile. 
At the same time attention is turned to the issue of the right of suffrage of the 
citizens of a state who permanently reside outside its territory. This concerns 
not only EU Member States, in which the freedom of movement and choice 
of the place of residence is one of its fundamental rules, but also other demo-
cratic states. However, there are no clearly defined international standards in 
this respect.29 The utilization of active suffrage with regard to a state, of which 
one is a citizen, but in which one does not reside permanently, and on which 
one may have an impact without having the knowledge its actual residents 
possess, is a matter provoking much controversy. The rights of this group 
of citizens result, after all, from their formal status, and the results of their 
political decisions do not affect them directly. This issue is solved in a vari-
ety of ways. The most common solution is granting a full active right to vote, 
though the regulations governing it may raise doubts as to whether the rule 
of equality has not been violated. For example, in Argentina, where voting is 
obligatory, this group has been excluded from this obligation, whereas Polish 
law allowed this group to vote by post in the elections to the Sejm and the 
Senate (acc. amended act of 2014). The second extreme approach to the issue 
is revoking their right to vote (Chile). What makes this solution worth con-
testing is the fact that a gross part of Chilean immigrants emigrated during 
Augusto Pinochet’s totalitarian regime. By choosing their place of residence 
in another country, they often did so to avoid the persecution of the military 
regime. The third approach, if we were to ignore a method involving the 
introduction of various restrictions in voter registration and limiting acces-
sibility to polling stations, is the one introduced in Italy, which involves the 
creation of constituencies abroad. Apart from being allowed to vote in these 
constituencies, a certain number of seats are allocated thereto as well.30 In this 
way citizens were provided with the possibility of unobstructed participation 
in elections while living abroad. Nevertheless, the number of allocated seats 
therein is not considerable, not to say symbolic — that is 2% to the Chamber 
of Deputies and the Senate. In Croatia, however, where a similar solution 
29 The European Commission for Democracy through Law operating under the Europe-
an Council (the so-called Venice Commission) adopted in 2002 the Code of Good Practice in 
Electoral Matters (CDL-AD (2002)023-rev.Or-fr), which states only that electoral rights can 
be granted to citizens residing outside of their country. The Commission also commented on 
the minimum age for voting, recommending that it be bound to the moment of gaining full 
civil rights.
30 Along with constitutional acts Nos. 1 of 2000 and 1 of 2001, 12 MPs and 6 senators 
are elected in foreign constituencies. Compare T. groPPi: “Forma rządu a systemy wyborcze 
we Włoszech.” Przegląd Sejmowy 2007, No 6, p. 56.
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has been employed, this share is significant. There, the number of seats in 
the special foreign constituency is 10% (14 seats).31 A solution was also dis-
cussed, whereby a time limit for living abroad would be introduced, and once 
exceeded, the voter would lose their active right to vote (such a solution was 
discussed in Croatia). On a comparative scale, this phenomenon cannot be 
precisely determined. The reason for this is that information concerning this 
issue is not registered everywhere.32 Without a doubt, the citizenship criterion 
competes with the domicile rule, which surely has an influence on the current 
shape of the principle of universality. 
1.3.
The scope of the passive voting right has been and is subject to consider-
able limitations. The differentiation of age in comparison to the active right 
to vote is quite common, although there are regulations aiming at equalizing 
the criteria of one and the other right. Citizenship is usually also an obliga-
tory requirement. This is also true for the domicile rule, though the solutions 
are more diverse in this respect. Restrictions on incompatibility and on a ban 
for running for office are a key issue. These are very important premises for 
the functioning of the rule of law. The ban on running for office (an absolute 
ban, albeit a conditional one) applies to certain professional groups (mainly 
professional soldiers, officers working for paramilitary organisations, for the 
police, prosecutors, judges, etc.) and persons performing official functions 
for set terms (ombudsmen, constitutional court judges, state council mem-
bers, civil services corps members, ambassadors, councillors, etc.). It also 
refers to restricting re-election. These solutions are common, however, their 
details differ from country to country. Incompatibilitas refers to the formal 
and material, as well as to the absolute and relative. The ban on holding 
two seats, though the ban on holding seats both in the local government and 
parliament appeared relatively recently, can be viewed also from the point of 
view of the separation of powers. 
The issue of the right to run for office also refers to the regulations on 
the nomination of candidates. These regulations are all the more important 
in those countries in which obligatory elections are employed. There, the 
voter has the obligation to decide who to vote for. Therefore, making sure 
that the voter is presented with a complete offer of politicians and political 
programs (using the language of mercantilism ever so popular in politics) is 
very important. 
31 Compare art. 40 of the act on the elections to the Croatian parliament of 9 April, 
2003 (Narodne novine 1999, No 116; Nard one novine 2000, No. 109; Narodne novine 2003, 
No. 53.
32 For example, in Spain it is 3%—4% of the electorate.
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Political parties, especially parliamentary parties, are dominant. This 
also refers to citizen groups, or associations. Their participation is consid-
erable and relatively common, especially on a local government level, or 
as some may put it, a sub-central or sub-state level. A multifaceted system 
for the nomination of candidates by political parties (in a legal sense) and 
other formalised subjects requires a change of the concept of a political party 
as understood by political science.33 In order to create optimal conditions 
needed to provide as complete an electoral offer as possible, it is essential to 
ensure the freedom of nomination, including the Anglo-Saxon tradition of 
self-nomination, provided these candidates have some minimal initial public 
support. In other words, a solution involving the simultaneous restriction of 
the passive right to vote inclusive of a broad freedom of nomination of can-
didates seems to be an optimal solution. Extending the electoral offer (if we 
are to continue using mercantile language) will at least create the conditions 
for increasing the turnout and bring us closer to the expression of public 
volition. 
1.4.
The requirements of voting secrecy are an issue which is directly cor-
related with the election rules. The most comprehensive meaning of this 
rule comes down to rendering the ballot fully and completely secret.34 The 
surveillance methods of today require the introduction of new safeguards. 
Information about our political preferences could potentially become great 
material for electoral marketing projects, which could include manipulation 
techniques. An old rule by which political parties resorted to an arsenal of 
ideological arguments and programs that articulated the political interests 
of social groups to which the parties then try to convince the voters, is no 
longer of any importance for many parties. Many parties running in elec-
tions are completely pragmatic and act on the whim of the prevailing political 
situation. Not only are they ridden of ideological traditions, but they fail to 
have any strategic programs too. They are ready to voice their support for 
33 Bearing this in mind, a political party is a mass, clearly identified formalised social 
group, which articulates its group interests and acts on the basis of a political program that 
corresponds with social ideals, and which in performing its pubic functions pursues its obje-
ctives via the hierarchical central and local state institutions or its relatively autonomous 
structures (territorial self-government, local autonomy, federal bodies). See also: J. iwAneK: 
“Partia regionalna, partia lokalna, regionalne i lokalne systemy partyjne — aspekty teore-
tyczne.” In: Autonomia terytorialna w perspektywie europejskiej. Regionalne i lokalne partie 
polityczne i systemy partyjne. Ed. J. iwAneK, w. woJTASiK. Toruń—Katowice 2014. 
34 B. Banaszak expresses the opinion that secrecy means safeguarding the voter against 
anyone discovering what his or her choice was. Compare B. BAnAszAk: Porównawcze pra-
wo…, p. 364.
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any solution that in the eyes of spin doctors can bring about victory, only 
to thrive on the bounty provided by state institutions. For this reason, the 
parties first analyse what the voters desire, remembering at the same time 
that these desires very often are the products of mass culture which are 
co-created, stimulated, popularised and initiated by the mass media, only 
to be later adapted and incorporated in slogans as well as tabloid and anti-
intellectual electoral programs. Parties that do not utilize manipulative tech-
niques will not survive in a manipulative type of democracy. After all, the 
revolts of the disgruntled (delicately put) that took place in several European 
countries several years ago have shaken, albeit delicately, the contemporary 
form of representative democracy, which in fact is the democracy of political 
parties. 
We can say that today we live in an aquarium, surrounded on each side by 
cameras and microphones. We are being assured that this is done for our own 
good, that is a conceptualisation of good put forward by the rulers. A histori-
an specialising in political systems will surely remind us here that ever since 
totalitarian regimes came to be, any restriction of the rights of the individual 
have been normally explained by the necessity to ensure safety. This is an 
issue that has existed since the Roman Republic, an issue between dictator-
ship and republic rule. 
The danger of surveillance also concerns postal voting. Especially if done 
outside the country. There are no effective measures safeguarding against the 
disclosure of the will of the voter. This may result in the same situation as 
was the case when US military personnel stationed abroad were allowed to 
vote by fax (i.e. openly). 
Voting via a representative also leads to a real, and not only potential, vio-
lation of secrecy. On the one hand it allows disabled people to use the cardi-
nal political rights (according to calculations, this concerns several percent of 
potential voters). On the other hand, equally importantly, it is another deter-
minant of the voter turnout. There is, however, a question about whether this 
contributes to a violation of the secrecy principle. After all, the voter has to 
disclose his political will to his representative. Doctrinally, the judgment over 
a conflict created thus between secrecy and actual use of the cardinal rights 
should nevertheless be made for the benefit of the voter, especially given that 
the voter themselves decides who to share this information with.35 Otherwise, 
this would mean that a considerable number of voters, in the range of several 
percent, would be ridden of their political rights. 
Similar reservations can be made with regard to the so-called e-voting 
method. In this case, the voter needs to be identified by the voting admi- 
35 There are many viewpoints that secrecy is not only a law but an obligation of the 
voter. 
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nistrator’s system, and then their vote needs to be qualified respectively.36 
Therefore, in e-voting, the secret ballot principle works only with regard to 
the electoral institutions of the state. Many issues relating thereto will most 
probably be solved along with the introduction of new software. It cannot, 
however, go unnoticed that in countries covering vast territories and with 
a small density of population, this method of voting is a great help in the 
exercise of political rights. In both of the cases, these solutions contribute to 
an increase in the voting turnout. 
1.5.
The principle of equality, in its formal shape, is not violated today. Apart 
from a few exceptions, the various kinds of privileges that were enjoyed in 
the past are no longer exercised either. Nor it is violated by legal differentia-
tion of voters between various constituencies (e.g. the use of a multiple vote 
dependent on the number of seats in a constituency diversifies this legal situ-
ation). It is, however, violated by creating different and better conditions for 
national minorities. This solution is nevertheless commonly accepted.37 Can-
didates of national minorities, should their rights be levelled off with those 
of others, would otherwise have poor chances for winning seats. It may be 
a factor contributing to deformation. Scale-wise, however, this would only 
apply to a limited extent. After all, the concepts of “political nation” or “state 
nation” do not take into account ethnic features. For this reason, I understand 
the equality principle as the guarantee of an identical legal situation for 
the voters in a given constituency. For this very reason, I do not share the 
opinion that the equality principle, from the point of view of comparative 
constitutional law, can be understood as a guarantee for giving one vote to 
every voter. 
The material equality of elections, that is the equal power of a vote, is 
very difficult to attain, not to say impossible. Jerzy Jaskiernia aptly pointed 
out that the equality principle not only signifies the same power of the vote 
in terms of its protected value, but also the existence of defined procedures, 
which should provide for such a guarantee.38 It is also questionable, in my 
view, whether the equality principle should be applied with regard to the 
passive right to vote. The aforementioned exclusions, which for democracy 
are often very desirable, are an obstacle in the creation of an identical legal 
situation for voters-candidates. 
36 This issue is discussed in the literature e.g. in D. miderA: “Głosowanie przez Internet 
a demokracja.” Studia Politologiczne 2011, Vol. 20.
37 Such exceptions are also permitted by the mentioned Code of Good Practice in Elec-
toral Matters.
38 J. JASKierniA: Zasada równości w prawie wyborczym USA. Warszawa 1992, p. 21.
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1.6.
The direct election principle needs no special explanation. I do not share 
the view that directness also means the need to vote in person.39 After all, 
it refers only to the direct relationship between the voter and the candidates, 
that is it signifies single-stage elections. Directness is nearly universal. Nev-
ertheless, wherever different solutions have been put in place, deformations, 
often significant, take place. An extreme example of deformation is the US 
presidential election of 2000.40 
1.7.
Free suffrage is a concept that provokes much discussion. Very often we 
hear voices stating that since elections are universal, equal, secret, direct and 
are conducted in conditions of political competition, it means at the same 
time that they are free. The evaluation is not made any easier by the fact that 
the issue is treated variously in comparative constitutional law.41 Free suf-
frage is mentioned in the constitution of the German Federal Republic, Italy 
and Turkey. The Spanish constitution, in article 68, section 1 in reference 
to the Deputies Congress mentions freedom as the second, after universal-
ity, electoral principle.42 However, many other constitutions make no mention 
of this whatsoever. The analysis of the range of this concept, including the 
comparative legal regulations and possible dangers, appears to be fully justi-
fied, not to mention necessary. Analogically, as in the case of the universality 
principle, in this case too, I perceive the principle of free suffrage in a nega-
tive light, that is as the direct or indirect influencing of the voter in the course 
39 Very often the directness of elections is also discussed in the case of voting through 
a representative. In my opinion, the rule applies only to the direct relationship between the 
voter and the candidate (single-stage elections). Various means of voting that include postal 
voting, voting via devices outside of the polling station or voting via a representative, which 
are being developed today, relate to the issue of individual voting. Otherwise, it would have 
to be considered that the direct election rule is being replaced by indirect elections. Not only 
is this not true, it would also violate the rules of democracy. 
40 As noted by R. ludwiKowSKi and A. ludwiKowSKA (Wybory prezydenckie w USA na 
tle porównawczym. Warszawa 2009, p. 106) the election of 2000 “called into question at 
least three elements of the American legal system: the concept of horizontal power function 
distribution, the interstate regulatory, executive and judicial institutions, and the concept of 
the election of the president by the electoral college.”
41 The Polish electoral laws after 1990 can serve as an example. In one of them it is men-
tioned, while in others it is omitted. 
42 What is interesting, proportional elections to this chamber are not dealt with in this 
regulation but a reference is made to the applicable law. Compare article 68, section 1 of the 
Constitution (Constitución Española de 27 de diciembre de 1978, Boletin Oficial del Estado 
nr 311 de 29 de diciembre 1978).
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of the election process as to whom he or she should vote for.43 This is the 
first and most important aspect of this principle. Particularly important are 
regulations on election silence, which it is so difficult to maintain these days, 
but which is also contested by politicians. Election silence, often impossible 
to ensure objectively (in states with various time zones, but also in the case 
of voting over longer (several-week long) periods, is nevertheless justified. 
I would take caution against resigning from it altogether just because it is 
difficult to guarantee in our world of global communication. I am also not 
convinced by arguments that there is no way to defend against or undertake 
a polemic against unjustified election accusations shortly before the end of an 
election campaign. After all, the same issues may arise at any time during 
the elections, even before the election silence period is put in place. A solu-
tion to this problem could possibly include strict sanctions, e.g. the revoking 
of the right to a seat or very high fines in the case of false accusations. Apart 
from the legal regulation aiming at ensuring the conditions for a safe, calm 
and politically neutral polling station, many research issues fall beyond the 
framework of our discourse. The reason for this is that they relate to election 
behaviour. 
The second aspect of the free suffrage principle looks slightly different. 
It refers to the issue of obligatory elections. It is not a problem of significant 
weight, especially given that obligatory elections are a very rare find these 
days. Nevertheless, the question of whether electoral absenteeism should be 
penalised in a democratic system is key. Most importantly, there are doubts 
as to its doctrinal nature. In my view, the right to absenteeism, the right not 
to vote is as strong a right as voting in itself. Logically speaking, these are 
two sides of the same electoral behaviour, that is the passive and the active 
side. If we claimed the opposite, we would have to accept that a voter who 
has been compelled to vote will be sure to find in the electoral offer a choice 
he or she can relate to both in terms of the candidates, political parties and 
their platforms. Such a conviction, however, has not right to exist. There will 
43 In most cases, however, positive descriptions are used. For example, B. BAnAszAk 
(Porównawcze prawo…, p. 366) notes that everybody can take advantage of the active and 
passive electoral right one is eligible to, freely without any physical and psychological coer-
cion or other external influences. It assumes political pluralism, free competition of parties 
in election campaigns and freedom in proposing candidates. Compulsory voting is also que-
stionable from this point of view. A. ŻukoWski (Systemy wyborcze. Olsztyn 1997, p. 34) in 
turn writes that the fulfilment if other adjectives provides for freedom of elections, plus other 
features such as competitiveness, periodicity and finality. M. Kruk-Jarosz believes that the 
constitutive meaning of this rule is much weaker and fragile than other principles. Free elec-
tions are: the competition between candidates and political options, freedom of expressing 
volition by voters (with no restraint), fair carrying out of the electoral procedure. J. BuczkoW-
SKi makes no mention of it (compare Podstawowe zasady prawa wyborczego III Rzeczypo-
spolitej. Lublin 1998).
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always be a part of the electorate who will never find anyone or anything 
suitable in an election to justify his or her active part therein. In addition, 
the penalisation that can be used in this situation cannot discredit the law. 
For this reason, an evaluation of obligatory elections from the point of view 
of their conformity with the free suffrage principle should most importantly 
be dependent on society’s level of political awareness. In other words, one 
should take into account whether or not such an election would be considered 
by the voters as free. It is also important whether there has been a long time 
tradition of obligatory elections. The direct influence on the turnout of such 
an election is undisputable. However, a full and complete picture will only be 
produced after we compare the turnout levels in elections that are no longer 
obligatory, and after analysing the scale of invalid votes. 
2.1.
The relationship between eligible voters (the electorate)44 and the number 
of people enjoying this right, that is active voters, is an important character-
istic of electoral systems. A study of electoral systems, as mentioned before, 
is carried out on four main planes: the state level, the regional level, the local 
level and the transnational level. This distinction seems to be necessary due 
to the differentiation of the electoral law. Most frequently, in the first case, 
it is the citizens of a state who have reached a required age that are eligible, 
while in the second and third case the condition of domicile also comes into 
play. However, we must remember that domicile may also cover foreigners 
residing permanently in the country. The first plane is easy to define, how-
ever under certain conditions. It is simple to indicate the relationship between 
the overall population and the number of persons who qualify on a state-wide 
level. Comparing statistical data is not problematic, especially given that the 
registration of people with the right to vote is generally carried out consist-
ently or periodically, before an election. It is much more difficult to con-
duct a comparison in regional electoral districts. This is true for elections to 
national institutions, except for the situations where the territory of the entire 
state constitutes one electoral district, and in elections to regional or local 
councils. In these cases, the situation will become differentiated depending 
on whether or not the electoral districts overlap with the territorial borders 
within the state. In the second case, up-to-date data is not always available. 
Committees determining the number of members in the particular districts, 
44 D. nohlen draws our attention to this issue (Prawo wyborcze i system partyjny. 
O teorii systemów wyborczych. Warszawa 2004, pp. 77 and 277) pointing to the constitu-
tion of Portugal of 1976, which recommends taking into consideration the number of those 
eligible to vote, also as a criterion for determining the borders of constituencies in British 
regions.
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the co-called border committees or electoral authorities, are required to peri-
odically verify the number of people qualified to vote in light of adjustments 
made with regard to the districts’ boundaries (most frequently these are sin-
gle-member districts), or in light of the determination of the number of seats 
in districts with reasonably permanent boundaries (the case in multi-member 
districts). There are surely these kinds of differences in particular democratic 
states, not only in terms of the various age structures of the population, but 
also with regard to the number of foreigners living in the countries. The aver-
age rate of eligible voters compared to the country’s population is ca. 80%. It 
may, however, be wholly different in its particular constituencies. Manipulat-
ing with constituencies has been known for years and is referred to as malap-
portionment or gerrymandering.45 Even if it is difficult to make an accusa-
tion that constituencies have consciously been manipulated with, one way or 
another, the imbalance between constituencies is one of a series of significant 
causes of deformation. Determining the relationship between a representa-
tion mandate and the potential number of voters, still remains a very difficult 
issue and is a key cause of deformation. This remark concerns both single-
member and multi-member constituencies. Very often adjustments are made 
in the course of the initial apportionment of seats for the particular regions. 
The British example clearly shows that the determination of the boundaries 
of a single-member constituency, from the point of view of a horizontal seat-
voter relationship is very difficult indeed, and disproportions between the 
constituencies even at the formal stage (initial stage) are considerable. Multi-
member constituencies, though they tend to limit this disproportion, are far 
from eliminating it altogether. The electoral law goes as far as permitting 
it to become even greater.46 This may concern both majority systems and 
other systems as well. First of all, each constituency is allocated a certain 
fixed number of seats, regardless of its number of residents or eligible voters. 
This solution, though necessary, as otherwise there would be constituencies 
with no seats apportioned, from the point of view of representativeness may 
breed deformation. The outcomes are diverse. From one seat per constitu-
ency (in the USA in the elections to the House of Representatives) to its mul-
tiplicity.47 When determining the number of the remaining seats, methods 
45 We must remember that gerrymandering has several meanings and manipulating the 
borders of constituencies is only one of the meanings. Compare J. JASKierniA: Zasada rów-
ności…, pp. 126 et seq.
46 B. Banaszak, in discussing the Polish local government law of the 90s, notes that it 
was possible to adjust the borders of constituencies by as much as 20% due to the economic, 
spatial and social conditions determined by social bonds. See: B. BAnAszAk: Prawo wyborcze 
obywateli. Warszawa 1996, p. 31.
47 For example, in Spain, there were three deputies per province (in the Real Decre-
to-Ley 20/1977 pre-constitutional regulation of 18 March). The organic function (LOREG 
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analogous to those used in the apportionment of seats between the electoral 
registers in the constituency are often employed. Also, in the electoral system 
to the European Parliament, on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty, a minimum 
number of seats for each state was announced in addition to the method of 
degressive proportionality in the apportionment of seats between the Member 
States.48 
A comparison between the real, actual results of the elections in all of 
a state’s constituencies and the simulated results, which would be achieved if 
the entire state was a constituency, produces a very clear picture of deforma-
tion. The scale of deformation is, most importantly, the result of the differ-
ences between the constituencies. This is not only about the mentioned dif-
ferences in the relationships between a seat in a constituency and the number 
of eligible voters per seat, but also about the differences in the turnouts in the 
constituencies, that is, about the materially differentiated strength of a single 
vote. This comparison requires the use of a specific mathematical method, 
but this necessitates one condition to be fulfilled: the use of the same method 
for the seat apportionment as was actually used in the constituencies. This, 
however, will not be possible in each case (e.g. in reference to certain forms 
of multiple votes). The phenomenon of over-representation and under-repre-
sentation may, however, be identified quite clearly. Some electoral systems in 
this situation reapportion their seats (Sweden) or introduce national lists in 
addition to the constituency lists. 
In the apportionment of seats between constituencies in elections based 
on popular representation, there is at least a pursuit for maintaining a formal 
balance, while in elections undertaking to establish a territorial representa-
tion, the deformation is much greater. The division of seats between con-
stituencies is usually carried out via a fixed indicator or one that is slightly 
differentiated.49 This is understandable to a certain degree since, after all, 
elected institutions, especially those in federal states or states that are heav-
ily decentralised, have a different systemic function. In this situation, the 
delivery of a social representation, which is a function of the election process, 
becomes less essential. 
nr 5/1985) kept a minimum number of deputies (102 seats in total out of an overall number of 
350). According to the Polish electoral law, there is a minimum of seven MP seats in a con-
stituency. This issue was regulated in detail in the first Polish electoral laws.
48 A. MisztAl aptly points out that despite this declaration, this method (Degressive pro-
portionality and the shaping of the composition of the European Parliament. Wrocław 2012, 
p. 75) was not precisely defined (i.e. via a mathematical equation))
49 An example of a fixed number of seats is illustrated by the American Senate, as well 
as the Spanish Senate (four seats per province, with a modification for island provinces, and 
a representation additionally supplemented with designated regional senators). An insignifi-
cant differentiation of seats can be found in Germany, though the Bundesrat is a non-electab-
le chamber operating for no defined term). 
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2.2.
The relationship between the electoral systems and the number of seats 
in collegial bodies appears to be an important factor. The achievement of 
both a broad social representation in collegial bodies and the effectives of 
their operation is surely not an easy task. The representative bodies of most 
of today’s democracies have many members. Generally too, regardless of the 
criticism of second chambers, which, to a certain extent results from a peri-
odic trend, they function effectively and a considerable number of MPs, 
and in many cases a considerable number of second chambers’ members as 
well, is no hindrance to their effective functioning. Apart from that, par-
liaments with many MPs present a potentially greater social representation, 
thus expressing a greater range of socially differentiated political preferences. 
From this point of view, one may say that the number of elected representa-
tives is a determinant of fair elections. This is true not only for the propor-
tions between the electorate and the number of allocated seats, but also about 
the relationship between the political image of the parliament and the politi-
cal image of society. The proportion between the number of voters and the 
number of parliamentarians, that is the ratio between the population and one 
representation mandate is an important prerequisite defining the functioning 
of a democratic system. The fewer people there are per one seat, the more 
the rule of representation is fulfilled. This is because such a situation cre-
ates better conditions for pluralism, which is ever so desired in democracy, 
and better secures against the political domination of one party, potential 
manipulation and dependence of MPs on a small group of political parties. 
The more entities there are, the more difficult the decision-making process is, 
but, on the other hand, the more effective is the functioning of the political 
control system and of political competitiveness.50 The parliaments of Great 
Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain all have very numerous assem-
blies. A political change involving a decrease of the number of representa-
tives, which often constitutes a political promise, combined with significant 
electoral deformation, restrictions on the control over the constitutional judi-
ciary system, control of the role of the mass media, may deform the political 
system, and may, in consequence, signify the beginning of its demise. 
2.3.
Selection of the electoral system, including the seat apportionment 
method, is without a doubt a political choice. The majority system, which is 
50 This is highlighted by W. woJTASiK (Funkcje wyborów w III Rzeczypospolitej. Teoria 
i praktyka. Katowice 2012, p. 47) who states that “elections constitute a means to solving 
political conflict, thanks to which a hierarchisation of political priorities takes place and 
solutions that yield as broad a level of acceptance as possible are sought.”
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historically the oldest, has not been much appreciated in present-day Euro-
pean democracies. Apart from the oldest European democracies, that is Great 
Britain and France, states that decide to implement it are few and far between. 
Proportional systems are the dominant solution, followed by systems that are 
also known as mixed systems. The methods used to apportion seats have 
been well defined in the literature, hence it will suffice for taking a closer 
look only at how electoral systems are qualified. This issue leads to mis-
understandings, especially when the names of the founders of a method are 
not used. Apart from that, some of them may yield, in specified conditions, 
identical results of an election. This should urge us to treat these methods 
as identical. It is also worth noting that we are dealing with a wide range of 
solutions and a long period of their implementation. 1855 is considered as the 
date when methods for dividing seats between lists in proportional systems 
began to be used. It needs to be remembered, however, that they had been 
invented earlier and adopted when seats were divided between constituencies 
(USA). Paradoxically then, proportional quotient methods were first used in 
majority systems. One of the first methods used were those of the American 
politicians: Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams and 
Daniel Webster.51 It also seems worth paying attention to their descriptions 
and classifications, which introduced modifications, leaving their mathemati-
cal formulas in place, but changed the output values, that is the symbols 
description in subsequent arithmetic operations. All this taken together com-
pels us to use very precise scientific language, not only in the description of 
the methods, but also in the evaluation of the electoral results achieved. 
2.4.
Electoral thresholds and bonuses are definitely those regulations that have 
a direct impact on the deformation of voting results. This is because they 
result from the acknowledgment that the function of the political creation 
of state institutions and of the stabilisation of the system of government are 
superior to the social representation function. Thresholds are an artificial, 
legal element, which though justified in so-called young democracies, as they 
protect against the anarchisation of political life, begin to lose their right 
to exist in stable democracies. There, thresholds may even inflict harm by 
hindering the entrance of new groups into politics. They are known better 
for protecting traditional parties than for stabilising the system of govern-
ment, which does not require such a form of artificial stabilisation. Thresh-
old limits are most frequently determined percentage-wise in reference to 
the number of votes received. Their most restrictive form are the restrictions 
51 Their descriptions can be found, among others, in B. michAlAK, A. SoKAlA: Leksykon 
prawa wyborczego i systemów wyborczych. Warszawa 2010.
65Jan Iwanek: Studying electoral systems…
imposed on a national level. Normally, they are also more distinctly different 
for individual parties than for their coalition alliances. The second solution 
may also be a hindrance in the establishment of such pre-election coalitions, 
which proves that a stabilising function played by threshold barriers is all 
the more difficult to achieve. After all, it is the pre-election coalitions in dis-
persed party systems that constitute system stabilisers, and not the other way 
around. Even though the average threshold scale can be identified as between 
3% to 5%, the accepted solutions are more differentiated and range from 
a few per mil to up to 20%. Normally, the values are higher in elections 
to second chambers. Other than percentage-based methods of determining 
thresholds are used much less frequently. Thresholds also tend to be used for 
the so-called secondary allocation of seats. Here, parties that have exceeded 
a determined, generally higher, electoral threshold (e.g. in Sweden in the 
elections to the Rikstag) qualify as eligible. Determination of the scale of 
deformation for a researcher is not a simple task. A comparison between the 
effective results, constituting the number of seats achieved, and the number 
of seats achieved through the electoral lists requires gathering data from 
many polling stations in particular constituencies. Though this is not impos-
sible, it requires long-term and incisive observation and research. 
It is also without a doubt that electoral bonuses for groups which lead in 
an election, deform the will of the voters. Bonuses may be defined in simple 
terms (the winner takes all, as in majority systems with multi-seat constitu-
encies), or through the determination of a high electoral result at over 50% of 
the votes in a constituency. A bonus will make it possible to win additional 
seats for parties which have received the most votes. One of the most promi-
nent examples is an Italian solution, the so-called “legge truffa” developed 
in the fifties. 
2.5.
The stability of an electoral system is a key prerequisite that influences 
the functioning of a system of government. Undoubtedly, the stability of the 
law allows not only responsible functioning of the institutions of a state in 
harmony with the principles of a democratic state based on justice and integ-
rity, but is also conducive to the shaping of the legal culture and democratic 
tradition. One of the conditions of democracy is, after all, the acceptance of 
its objectives, values and procedures by society. Furthermore, tradition estab-
lishes the boundaries for political change and the autonomy of law in relation 
to the political situation of the current system of government. Only because 
a party has been given the mandate to manage state institutions for a deter-
mined term does not mean it can rule as it likes and disrespect the consti-
tutional values and the principle of the law of a state. In this context, even 
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such electoral systems, which are ridden with defects, stimulate the shaping 
of socially acceptable procedures, including the treatment of elections as the 
only path for political change, and the respect for the election results. Such 
a rule, which is addressed to a political minority, benefits the minority in the 
long-run. After all, a minority may in the future become a parliamentary 
majority and will rightly expect its victory to be recognised. Stable elec-
toral systems also have a positive influence on the electoral turnout. This 
is proven by information gathered from mature democratic states. Further-
more, there are examples when this temporary and radical change of electoral 
systems introduced shortly before an election delivered defeat to those that 
introduced it. The stability of the electoral law is also an important factor to 
be taken into account. It allows one to recognise, describe and diagnose the 
long-term trends in the process of the election of public authorities and, in 
consequence, to establish a set of comprehensive proposals for future reform 
based on research results. 
2.6.
The turnout does not only constitute an important indicator of democracy 
that tells us a lot about the condition of civic awareness, but is also an impor-
tant gauge that informs us about the actual social support for particular polit-
ical parties or other structures into which society is organised (associations, 
formalised citizen groups, self-appointing candidates). The way the turnout 
is organised differs between democratic states and varies depending on the 
type of election. Turnout levels range from a dozen or so (in by-elections) to 
around 90% in the case of some parliamentary elections. The range is thus 
very broad and becomes even more so if we relate the turnout to the popula-
tion. In an ideal democracy, the greater the turnout, the better. However, par-
ties rarely win more than 50% of votes. 
3.
Representative democracy finds a specific type of competition in what 
can be referred to as opinion poll democracy. Opinion poll publications not 
only are an element of contemporary political practice (there have been cases 
where governments collapsed as a result of poor opinion poll ratings), but 
they lead to many other consequences. 
The issue is not with carrying out polls or making predictions on the out-
come of an election. Just how important opinion polls are is clear and needs 
no explaining. Polls are often made on the order of political parties or the 
mass media. It is necessary, however, to take a look at how the results of 
the polls are published. Very often they are presented in a simplified form, 
without reference to the research methods used, the size of the test sample 
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etc., the results of which are of a political nature, especially when published 
in the pre-election period. Opinion poll results impact electoral behaviour. 
The results also impact the further course of the development of the gov-
ernment’s behaviour. Very often, political parties adjust their programs to 
improve their ratings. As a result, the benefits of the term-based nature of 
representative democracy, which is supposed to guarantee not only the peri-
odic stability of public authority but also the periodicity of public control 
needed to ensure that the political program of the party in power is carried 
out, is greatly reduced. The pressure exerted by opinion polls determines how 
the governing authorities adjust to their results. Parties are slowly becoming 
“catch-all” type parties, that is parties that change their behaviour depend-
ing on the political situation, and politics is losing its ethical standards. The 
political role of the mass media, which are more and more becoming a party 
in political disputes, is also rising. It is important to remember that the fourth 
power (I have always considered it to be the first power) can act with much 
more freedom, under minimum legal regulations and a negligible responsibil-
ity in comparison to the other powers. Present-day democracy has undergone 
a significant transformation. The issue is not about belittling public opinion, 
but rather about the danger posed by the constant pressure it exerts, which 
is often tainted with political interest. Public opinion, which is often exter-
nally shaped, is artificially enhanced by so-called expert opinions. There is no 
other way to refer to several-second-long speeches made by respected person-
alities to legitimise a selected item of information. Giovani Sartori talks about 
the special role of TV, an image medium, which he refers to as videopoli-
tics. These are his words: „Demokrację określano często jako rząd opinii i ta 
definicja okazała się wyjątkowo trafna wraz z pojawieniem się videopolityki. 
Ponieważ to jasne, że telewizja jest jednym z najpotężniejszych instrumentów 
kształtowania opinii. Dzisiaj suwerenny naród zazwyczaj »wyraża sądy« 
w zależności od tego, jaką opinię podpowie mu telewizja. Kierując zaś opi- 
niami, telewizja doprawdy rozciąga swą władzę nad centrum, gdzie zachodzą 
wszystkie procesy współczesnej polityki.”52 The concepts I am referring to 
fall under political psychology and social psychology, and are outside of my 
area of interest. What is important for scientists specialising in electoral sys-
tems are the legal regulations governing the publication of opinion polls and 
forecasts in the pre-election period, as well as determining this phenomenon 
by comparing poll-based forecasts with the actual election results. 
4.
The issues presented previously, which fall under the methodological 
scope of electoral systems research, have been selected at the discretion of 
52 G. SArTori: Homo videns…, p. 38.
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the author and constitute his theoretical and axiological choice. The spec-
trum covered by these issues is broad though I am far from believing that 
it is all-inclusive. The process we are dealing with is dynamic, and will 
surely provide new research opportunities in the future. Nevertheless, the 
scope I have provided is relatively broad. Deformation researchers do not 
normally conduct such multi-faceted analyses that would correspond with 
all the issues presented herein. Partial analyses, based on specific research 
methods, are currently the dominant form of research. Selecting a method 
involves choosing the most reliable and objective research instrument. Nev-
ertheless, it almost always involves choosing a certain range of model vari-
ables. As always, a model approach may also carry the risk of being sub-
jective. Public life is too diverse for a researcher to use just one method in 
the long-run. Furthermore, a researcher must decide whether it is suitable 
for studying a given electoral system of a particular state. For this very 
reason, methods of studying electoral deformation (also referred to as indi-
ces) evolve, and their authors are numerous. These methods can be divided 
into two basic groups: electoral behaviour gauges and gauges measuring 
the impact of the electoral system on the party system. The second group 
includes mainly proportionality and disproportionality indices, indices of 
the effective number of parties, of fragmentation and fractionalisation of 
the party system, of party aggregation and government relevance. These 
gauges became popular in the 50s of the 20th century thanks to Mau-
rice Duverger (Duverger’s law). Some well known political scientists and 
authors of various methods include in particular Arendt Lijphart, Michael 
Gallagher, Matthew S. Shugart, Douglas W. Rae, Markku Laakso and Rein 
Taageper. 
The relationship between electoral systems, party systems and the 
state-institutional elements of a political system are undisputed. However, it 
is difficult to speak of any automaticity or unidirectional influence. There 
have been examples where a change of the electoral system did not lead to 
significant changes in the party system (Italy 2005—2006), or those that invol- 
ved a change of the party system without affecting the electoral system 
(Spain, Great Britain). On the other hand, Italy remains an interesting exam-
ple. There, changes to the electoral and party systems that took place in 
1993—1994 led to the coining of the term “second republic” by the Italian 
media and literature.53
Utilizing indices to study deformation phenomena is of course desired, 
however their selection should be correlated with the specific electoral system 
53 Unfortunately, this term is also indiscriminately repeated in some Polish papers. 
Unfortunately — because in the tradition that had been in force until then, the numbering 
was related to different political systems, whereas in Italy the system model (parliamentary-
cabinet system) did not change. 
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and to the periods being studied in order to describe the typical trends and 
features of deformation. 
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